We give a class of proof nets for Intuitionistic Linear Logic with the connectives (;!, prove a correctness criterion for them and show that a games semantics can be directly derived from these nets, along with a full completeness theorem.
It is well-known that games semantics is intimately connected to linear logic, but there is an important example of games semantics where the connection is far from clear, namely Hyland and Ong's 9] for the simply typed lambda-calculus and PCF. Although in this semantics the construction of the function space (intuitionistic implication) depends quite explicitly on the standard decomposition X ) Y = !X (Y , it is not clear at all how one would be able to describe the semantics of these two linear operators independently. In particular if one naively follows the spirit of the constructions given in that paper, it seems one would get that the natural morphism !X ! !!X (comultiplication in the comonad) is an isomorphism. It follows from the theory of (co)monads that the two possible natural morphisms !!X ! !X would be identical, which means an enormous loss of information in such a semantics, something quite unlike what we would expect from games semantics.
In this paper we give a games semantics for propositional intuitionistic linear logic with the connectors ( and !, along with a full completeness theorem of the likes of 9,2]. We should mention that apart from Hyland and Ong's, the other games semantics with a full completeness theorem for the lambda-calculus, Abramsky-Jagadeesan-Malacaria's 2], is easier to relate to linear logic, and this is due to its close relation to the Geometry of Interaction 6]. We will see that this jump from the simply typed lambda-calculus to the smallest fragment of linear logic able to express it is rather nontrivial, due to the appearance of new subtleties. Our approach will start by giving a theory of proof nets for this logical fragment, with the usual correctnes criterion. We call these nets semantical nets. Given a proof net, we then show how a strategy for a two-person game can be constructed from it, as a set of paths in the proof net. The correctness condition that describes the strategies that come from proofs can then be readily deduced. Hence semantical nets c 1996 Elsevier Science B. V.
can be thought of as an intermediary step between the sequent calculus and the games, that makes the relationship between games semantics and syntax absolutely explicit. This is due to the fact that the theory of semantical nets is such that their behavior follows that of games very closely, to the point that the set of correct (proof) nets over a sequent is in bijective correspondence with the set of strategies that can be constructed from the sequent calculus.
Semantical nets
We use a presentation of intuitionistic linear logic that uses one-sided sequents 3, 4, 13, 14] . Therefore all formulas including the propositional variables have either Danos-R gnier polarity Output, denoted (these are the ones that we want to model, i.e. they are equivalent to formulas made with ( and !), and
Input, denoted (these are the formal linear negations of the previous ones). Therefore a sequent always looks like`X 1 ; : : : ; X n ; Y (a polarity superscript on a formula says that the formula has that polarity). If V is a set of type variables (that we denote ; : : :), the atomic formulas of our system are polarized variables like ; , and the other formulas are built using the following connectors, along with polarity rules X Y
Formal negation is de ned as usual:
For the time being the axioms in our system are all of the form` ; for the variables (but see below. . . ). The inference rules are those of ordinary classical linear logic for the given connectives (without Cut), requiring in addition that the polarity rules be respected. Let an ordinary formula be any formula X constructed with the unpolarized variables of V and the operators ( and !. To an ordinary formula X one can by induction associate a formula X in the one-sided system: = ,
Proposition 1.1 The (?) translation is a bijection from the set of ordinary formulas onto the set of one-sided formulas of polarity . Given a sequent ?`Y there is a bijective correspondence between the set of its proofs in the ordinary two-sided intuitionistic system with the set of proofs of`(? ) ? ; Y in our one-sided system. The proof is simply the remark that the one-sided introduction rules for the Input connectives ; ? can be put in correspondence with the left rules for (respectively) (;!, while the Output introduction rules for O; ! correspond to the right rules for (;!. In the one-sided sequent Contraction and Weakening are always done on Input formulas (since ? ) while in the two-sided system they are always done on left formulas.
Box
If (F; ) is a set equipped with a forest structure (i.e., is a partial order such that for every x 2 F the set x# is a nite total order), given x 2 F we 2 Lamarche denote by F x] its predecessor if it exists, which happens exactly when x is not a root.
Let`? be a sequent in our system. We will consider it as a multiset of formulas, so as not to have to bother with the exchange rule. 1 This has the advantage of making the operation of contraction cocommutative and coassociative, without the need for any kind of theory of normal forms or congruence relation on nets. In the same spirit, a ?-occurence in O ? such that nothing is mapped to it by should be one which has only been intro-duced through weakenings. Thus we also make weakening a natural counit to contraction. This approach is absolutely suitable for us: in games semantics, the game tokens associated to a formula that has been introduced only through weakenings will never be played. The need for our nets to correspond very closely to games semantics poses a little problem, though: suppose a ?-formula ?X is introduced via weakening, resulting in the sequent`?X; ?; Y , and that a -introduction is done on it, giving the sequent` ; Z ?X; ?; Y . A -occurence b has been added just below ?X, and one expects a -link x to be added above b, because such things are usually done when one builds proof nets. But then the rules of games semantics say that the game tokens associated to and Z will never be played, because they can only be reached if tokens of ?X are played before, which cannot happen. Thus all the information about the proof of the sequent ; Z is lost in the stragegy associated to` ; Z ?X; ?; Y . If we want a full completeness theorem there are two possible ways to address this problem: one way is to forbid -introductions (and derelictions) on formulas that have been weakened. Another, more natural approach is to allow a zero axiom: to our system we add all the axioms z ? ; Y , for all possible sequents ?; Y , the interpretation of these axioms being the empty nets. This is an atrocity from the traditional point of view of formulas-as-assertions, but absolutely natural when viewed computationally: the zero axioms are just the syntactical counterpart to bottom morphisms in semantics. We will see below how this axiom is used in the construction of proof nets. Notice that this problem does not arise in the lambda calculus, since there a ?-occurence always has a O-occurence for predecessor.
The A proto-net has to satisfy a third condition, very much like ?1:
Root Given a non-empty proto-net N above sequent`?; Y , there is a unique r 2 N above (the root of) Y .
In order to conclude the de nition of a proto-net (N; ; ), we have to de ne . It is a transposition (a permutation such that 2 is identity) on the set of leaves (variable links) of N, such that If (x) is an occurence of variable p of polarity p, then ( (x)) is an occurence of the same variable, but of the opposite polarity. Thus encodes the axiom links of traditional proof nets, in a quite standard way 8].
Contrary to standard practice, we will de ne proof nets (in other words give the correctness criterion) before we show how they are constructed from proofs. This is done right after De nition 1.8, and the reader who wants a bit 4
more motivation for what immediately follows can go there. Given a proto-net (N; ; ) above sequent`? =`X 1 ; : : :; X n ; Y , we de- Thus the de nition of a path follows the same rules as in 13]: starting at r, always going up in links of polarity Output, until we reach a variable, then crossing through an axiom link to links of polarity Input, then going down in links of that same polarity, being allowed to go up again any time we are immediately under a link of polarity Output (i.e., on a -link automorphisms also preseve paths, and the functorial map above. Therefore there can be at most one isomorphism between two correct proto-nets, and in particular the only automorphism of a correct proto-net is identity. The only data that's still missing before we can de ne proof nets is the information needed to describe !-boxes. We use a very simple-minded approach.
De nition 1.6 Given a proto-net (N; ; ) over sequent ? a sub-protonet is a subset M N which is up-closed for the order and closed under .
Thus a sub-protonet M N inherits a forest structure. We can think of M as a protonet over the sequent whose syntactic forest O = (M)" is the up-closure of the direct image of M; obviously this will make sense only if has exactly one formula of polarity ; actually it can be proved that this always happen. 5 Let P be a proof of`? in the sequent calculus. By induction we show how to construct a proof net (N P ; P ; P ; (N P;x ) x2B(N P ) ).
If P is an ordinary axiom, say ? = ; , then P is identity on O ? and P exchanges the two leaves of N P = O ? . If P is a zero axiom, say`z?, then N P is the empty set and P the unique map to O ? .
In the cases that follow, when nothing is said about the de nition of P (or (N P;x ) x ), it is because the de nition in question is trivial: either the structure is inherited from the antecedent net, or N P (or B(N)) is empty. Or the inverse image ?1 P 0 (X) is empty. Then N P = N P 0 and P is the composite N P 0 ! O X; ! O ? , where the rst morphism is P 0 and the second one the obvious embedding. If ? = ; Z X; ; Y and P has been obtained from P 1 ; P 2 via aintroduction, P 1 being a proof of ; Z and P 2 a proof of X; ; Y , then three things may happen:
There are links in N P 2 above X and N P 1 is not empty. where x is mapped to the new below Z; X, P being the sum of P 1 ; P 2 elsewhere. The rule that requires P to respect the predecessor function forces x to be -below all the links above Z; X. P is the permutation that restricts to P i on N P i and the family (N P;x ) x is the union of N P 1 ;x and N P 2 ;x (obviously, B(N P ) = B(N P 1 ) B(N(P 2 ))). The inverse image ?1 P 2 (X) is empty and N P 1 not empty. Then N P = N P 2 and P is P 2 followed by the embedding of O P 2 in O P . The information in N P 1 is discarded. N P 1 is empty. Then N P is the empty net. Category theory gives an explanation for this radical loss of information: in monoidal closed category with zero morphisms, tensoring any morphism with a zero morphism yields a zero morphism. If P has been obtained from a proof P 0 of`?X; ?X; by contracting the two ?X, then N P = N P 0 and P is P 0 followed by the map O ?X;?X; ! O ? that identi es the two occurences of ?X. If ? = ?X; and P has been obtained from P 0 by introducing ?X via weakening, then N P = N P 0 and P is P 0 followed by the embedding O ! O ? .
If P has been obtained from a proof P 0 of`? ; Y by a !-introduction, then two cases may happen: N P 0 is empty. Then N P is empty too. N P 0 is nonempty. Then we know from Root and 1.9 that there is a unique y above Y , and N P is obtained by adding a !-link z to N P 0 and a new !-box N z = N P . Theorem 1.9 Given a proof P of`?, then N P is a proof net. Conversely, given any proof net N over O ? , there is a proof P such that N = N P .
Games
We apologize for the lack of examples in this preliminary report. Notice that because of 1.2 a denomination d is entirely determined bỳ (d); in particular there is a unique denomination d not justi ed by anything, the one such that`(d) is the root occurence X: we call it the unjusti ed denomination of X; it has the same polarity as the formula X. Notice also that the structures (O X ; ) and ( Since P X has a tree structure via the pre x ordering, in such a way that the predecessor function P X ?] alternates polarity, we can consider the elements of P X as the positions in a two-person game; the positions of polarity Output belong to Opponent; the ones of polarity Input are for Player.
Let`? =`X 1 ; : : : ; X n ; Y be a sequent and (N; ; ; (N x ) x ) a proof net over it. We are interested in assigning a playing strategy S N for Player on 8 the game P ? ; notice that in this case it is always Opponent who begins, and he never has a choice for the rst move: he has to play the unjusti ed denomination of Y . Notice also that P ? is nite when ? does not contain If 2 S and = (d; p) 2 P ? is a successor to then 2 S (the strategy takes account of all possible moves by Opponent). This notion of strategy will be followed (in particular we can say that the rules of the game are entirely encoded in P ? ), except that we have to allow empty strategies to deal with empty nets.
De nition 2.6 Let N be a correct protonet over sequent ? = X 1 ; : : :; X n ; Y . A partnet is a subset M N which is -down-closed, and such that given x 2 M there is always a path x 1 x n x 2 Path(N) with x i 2 M, for all 1 i n.
Before we give the formal de nition of the strategy S N P ? , we will try to say what it is about by giving some of its properties, in the hope of making the de nition seem almost inevitable. (this makes full sense, since a !-box is itelf a correct proto-net), instead of the full N.
De nition 2.7 Let (N P ; P ; P ; (N P;x ) x2B(N P ) ) be a proof net. A box of N is a sub proto-net M N which is either a !-box N x , or the full net N, which we denote N r (notice here that r has a special status: r might be a !-link x, but we do not necessarily have N x = N r ).
Notice that the same !-box may be entered an arbitrary number of times during play, and therefore that a position may contain partial descriptions of the same !-box, these descriptions being in various stages of completion. This is necessary since a !-link may be cut against an arbitrary number of ?-links, because of contractions. Thus there is the need to de ne the current (edition of the) box we are playing in , which will use our counterpart to the Hyland-Ong notion of scope.
De nition 2.8 Given Notice the similarity with 9]. We can now de ne Entry( ) as the least element of Scope( ). By the de nition above (the last move in) j Entry( ) is a move which is either the opening of a new !-box, or the very rst move. . . the opening of the whole net seen as a box. Such opening moves are exactly the such that Scope( ) is a singleton; the least element`(Br( )) 2 N is either a !-link, or the global entry point r when is the rst move; hence they de ne a box N x , which is N r = N in the latter case. Since j Entry( ) is always such an opening , for any 2 P ? we de ne Box( ) = Box( j Entry( ) ) to be the box N x associated to j Entry( ) . These requirements explain among other things the need for Exc in the de nition of P ? . Some moves will not be directly justi ed by a previous position because of the presence of !-boxes that are strictly smaller than N. One remarkable consequence of the de nitions above is that strategies are no longer innocent in the sense of Hyland-Ong. This has to do with the fact that in a move (d; i), the pointer i may not necessarily be in Scope( ). The order in which moves are played now has a part in de ning the strategy.
It is now easy to see that a full completeness theorem can be obtained from the semantics we have given. Given a sequent ?, one can state when a given pre x-closed subset S P ? is correct, in other words when it is of the form S N for a proof net N over ?, simply because if it exists, N can be constructed by looking at S. The construction of N can be obtained by looking only at a nite subset of S, (one such that every box is visited in full), but if !-denominations appear in S, the strategy is in nite and has to satisfy global coherence conditions, that say for example that every edition of a given box is the same sub proto-net.
Since P X and P X ? are isomorphic, cut-elimination (composition) la Joyal 11, 1] can be de ned as usual. The only detail where things are a little di erent is that whenever one of the strategies is empty, the whole result is empty. Theorem 2.9 The composition of two correct strategies is correct.
